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Abstract 
 
This paper examines how the adoption of mobile information technology 
networks impact firm strategy and performance in the U.S. taxicab industry.  
Using a rich, novel firm-level data set from the Economic Census, I test 
transaction cost economics’ prediction that adoption of mobile IT networks leads 
to shifts in the boundary of the firm toward increased fleet ownership of vehicles.  
I then exploit the homogeneity of the industry’s production function and 
exogenous variation in local market conditions to precisely measure the impact 
of adoption of mobile IT networks on productivity.  I find strong evidence that 
firms respond to adoption of mobile IT networks by changing their 
organizational structure, shifting toward owning a greater fraction of vehicles in 
their fleets (as opposed to contracting with independent driver-owners for 
vehicles).  I then use a precise and economically meaningful measure of firm 
performance to show that adoption of mobile IT networks causes firms to 
become more productive.  The results suggest that adoption of mobile IT 
networks increases asset utilization by improving within-firm coordination but 
that firms must simultaneously shift toward a more highly vertically integrated 
structure to fully capture the benefits of mobile IT networks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Information technology (IT) networks are profoundly changing how firms coordinate production 
decisions within firms.  This paper examines how the adoption of mobile IT networks affects firm 
strategy and impacts firm performance in the U.S. taxicab industry.  Using a precise and 
economically meaningful measure of firm performance, I find evidence that adoption of mobile 
IT networks causes firms to become more productive than non-adopters.  Moreover, consistent 
with the predictions of transaction cost economics (Williamson 1975 and 1985), firms respond to 
adoption of mobile IT networks by changing their organizational structure, shifting toward 
owning a greater fraction of vehicles in their fleets (as opposed to contracting with independent 
driver-owners for vehicles).  The results suggest that adoption of mobile IT networks increases 
asset utilization by improving within-firm coordination but that firms must simultaneously shift 
toward a more highly vertically integrated structure to fully capture the benefits of mobile IT 
networks, although I cannot formally reject the null hypothesis that the asset utilization and asset 
ownership effects operate independently. 
  
This paper addresses endogeneity issues in the relationship between adoption of mobile IT 
networks, firm productivity and asset ownership in two important ways.  First, by linking mobile 
IT network adoption directly to firms, empirical tests that focus on within-firm changes in 
productivity and the boundary of the firm control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics of 
firms that may bias cross-sectional results.  Second, because U.S. taxicab markets are 
geographically isolated from one another this paper essentially examines one-hundred and fifty 
distinct local markets.  I exploit the exogenous variation in local market conditions using an 
instrumental variables approach to control for unobservable characteristics of firms that may be 
correlated with both adoption and productivity and/or the boundary of the firm.  The instrument I 
deploy for adoption is lagged average fleet size of other fleets in the same market.  The effect of 
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lagged size of other fleets in the same market should be orthogonal to changes in “own” firm 
boundaries and productivity.  However, lagged average fleet size may be correlated with adoption 
to the extent that markets with larger average fleet size are the kinds of markets where adoption is 
more likely to be prevalent.   
 
I find strong evidence that adoption leads to higher rates of fleet ownership of vehicles and 
increases firm productivity.  The results are consistent with transaction cost economics and 
suggest that there are complementarities between the adoption of mobile IT networks and fleet 
ownership of vehicles.   
 
The rest of this document is organized as follows: 
 
Section 2 explores the conceptual foundation for this paper and describes the related literature.  
Section 3 describes the institutional context in which mobile IT networks are used in the U.S. 
taxicab market.  Section 4 develops explicit adoption and productivity hypotheses.  Section 5 
describes the data and the empirical strategy.  Section 6 discusses the results.  Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual framework and related literature 
 
Mobile information technology networks are fundamentally altering how firms organize 
production.  Given the rapid growth of mobile IT networks in the modern economy, gaining a 
deeper understanding of the relationship between the adoption of mobile IT networks, firm 
strategy and performance is of great importance.  To address these questions the paper builds on 
and integrates contract theory and the empirical literatures on information technology and firm 
boundaries.   
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 Understanding patterns of asset ownership has been a central issue in organizational economics 
since Coase (1937), who argued that firms should coordinate transactions internally only when 
doing so is more efficient than coordinating those activities through markets.  Contract theorists 
extended and refined Coase’s insight by highlighting the importance of contractual 
incompleteness in the presence of potential opportunism, in particular the problem of hold-up 
with respect to firm specific investments, in drawing the boundary of the firm (Williamson 1975, 
1985; Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978).  When taxi fleets implement mobile IT networks they 
force independent owner-drivers, who could formerly contract with the fleet for generalized 
radio-based dispatching services, to choose between being excluded from the fleet’s network or 
adopting specialized on board computers (OBC).  OBC are usually incompatible with other 
fleets’ dispatching systems and therefore cannot be easily redeployed.  Thus, following the 
adoption of a mobile IT network, fleets and their pool of potential driver-owners face a joint 
investment decision over OBC that has the potential to fundamentally change their contracting 
relationship.  As predicted by contract theory, which emphasizes the role of asset specificity in 
the vertical integration decision, adoption of mobile IT networks leads to a shift in the boundary 
of the firm toward fleet ownership of vehicles as fleets acquire independent owner-operators who 
do not wish to invest in OBC as non-integrated agents of the fleet.   
 
While there are alternative theoretical lenses through which to view boundary of the firm 
questions besides transaction cost economics, the issues of incomplete contracting, hold-up and 
asset specificity are particularly salient in this context.  Indeed, one of the contributions of this 
paper is its sharp theoretical focus on the role of transaction cost economics in the context of 
technological change.  Given our expectation that mobile IT networks increase the efficiency of 
coordinating a network of distributed assets, and the fact that adoption of OBC is a firm-specific 
investment that cannot be easily redeployed to another firms mobile IT network, transaction cost 
 4
economics should particularly well suited to render predictions about the effect of adoption on the 
boundary of the firm.  By contrast, agency theory and the property-right theory of the firm rely on 
variation in incentives between employees and contractors (Grossman and Hart 1986), a notion 
that seems far less germane in an industry where high-powered incentives are nearly ubiquitous 
across ownership states.  Since most taxi drivers are full residual claimants there is little room to 
consider the incentive changing effects of investments in mobile IT networks in taxicab fleets. 
 
By integrating technological change into a transaction cost economics framework the paper builds 
on and extends the literature on information technology and firm strategy.  While the theoretical 
implications of mobile IT networks on the boundary of the firm are relatively straightforward in 
this context, examining the empirical relationship between investments in mobile IT networks 
and firm strategy from a transaction cost economics perspective is an important step in 
developing our understanding of the strategic implications of mobile IT networks specifically and 
coordination technologies more generally.  In a recent paper, Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw (2005) 
find evidence that adoption of stand-alone information technology changes the organization of 
production in valve manufacturing firms.  This paper considers similar questions but differs from 
theirs in that I consider the impact of the adoption of mobile IT networks on firm strategy and 
performance.   
 
The two papers most closely related to this work, Hubbard (2003) and Baker and Hubbard (2003) 
study of the effect of OBC adoption on truck utilization and the boundary of trucking fleets.  
Hubbard (2003) finds evidence that OBC improves asset utilization and Baker and Hubbard 
(2003) find that incentive-improving features of OBC push the boundary of the firm toward 
driver-owned vehicles, while coordination-improving features of OBC pull the boundary of the 
firm back toward fleet-ownership.  However, Baker and Hubbard (2003) could not link OBC 
adoption to fleets and therefore could not control for omitted variables that affect both the 
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technology adoption decision and the boundary of the firm.  This paper builds on Hubbard (2003) 
and Baker and Hubbard (2003) by examining within-firm changes in performance and the 
boundary of the firm, following the adoption of mobile IT networks.  This distinction is important 
because unobserved heterogeneity amongst adopting and non-adopting biases cross-sectional 
analyses.  By examining changes in productivity and the boundary of the firm within-firm, the 
empirical design controls for time-invariant characteristics of firms which may affect both 
adoption and performance and/or boundary of the firm decisions.  I explicitly control for 
unobservable characteristics of firms that may bias the results using an instrumental variables 
(IV) approach that exploits the exogenous characteristics of the local markets in which taxicab 
fleets operate.   
 
3. Institutional context 
 
Taxi fleets began using computers during the 1970s, but fully automated data dispatch systems 
did not arrive until the early 1980s.  Even then adoption of mobile IT networks, comprised of a 
central coordination and communication technology and specialized vehicle-level on-board 
computers, was limited to a handful of firms until the early to mid-1990s.  These systems use a 
mobile data terminal installed in each vehicle. Basic mobile IT networks systems called “partially 
automated” systems require drivers to indicate their location by entering a zone number into the 
terminal and transmitting it to the computer, which organizes vehicles into queues for each zone. 
When a customer requests a ride, the computer determines the caller location using a built-in 
street directory and sends a message to a central dispatcher.  More advanced systems called “fully 
automated” systems deploy in-car devices with two-way communication capability, allowing the 
back-end optimization algorithm to communicate directly with vehicles.  These systems also 
automatically monitor pickup and drop-off actions, such as turning the meter on and off.  The 
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most advanced mobile IT networks are GPS-based, which eliminates the need for drivers to enter 
zone numbers and tracks a vehicle’s exact location at all times. 
 
Computerized dispatch greatly simplifies the coordination of large taxicab fleets. It can also end 
claims of dispatcher favoritism by drivers, end call stealing by other cab companies using radio 
scanners, and can simplify communication between dispatchers and foreign-born drivers. 
However, non-GPS-based systems do not verify the location of a cab and cannot prevent drivers 
from manipulating the dispatch system by misrepresenting their current status or location.  
Nevertheless, a 1993 case study of 16 fleets with an average of 300 cabs documented 50 to 60 
percent reductions in dispatch time at an average cost of $1 million (Gilbert, Nalevanko and 
Stone, 1993). More advanced systems rely on in-car terminals with two-way communication 
ability.  These in-car terminals are three to four times as expensive as one-way communication 
terminals.  By contrast the back-end computing cost for a fully-automated system is only 50%-
100% more expensive than the back-end computing cost for a partially automated system.  Thus, 
economies of scale in purchasing are actually steeper for partially-automated systems than for 
fully-automated and GPS systems. 
 
Besides strategic issues, local regulatory, competitive and unique geographic factors can 
influence the costs and benefits of installing computerized dispatching. Most of these factors are 
exogenous to the choices of taxi fleet operators and provide the natural experiment missing from 
many studies of technology adoption.  Local regulations1 can set retail prices, fix the number of 
permits or medallions, devise a permit allocation system (e.g., lottery or auction), set limits on the 
transferability of permits, set restrictions on the entry and exit of fleets and may require either 
fleets or individuals to own operating permits.  Differences between cities, such as regulated fare 
                                                 
1 Taxi regulation is usually promulgated at the city level.  As of 1997 seven states used a uniform code to 
regulate taxis:  Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, New Mexico, Rhode Island.  
Kentucky has subsequently changed to city-level regulation. 
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changes, may also influence the adoption of automated dispatch systems by changing the benefits 
of adoption.  Moreover, the unique geography of a city can influence the distribution of rides 
between dispatched fares and curbside hails.  The paper exploits this natural variation in markets 
by using market-level instrumental variables to control for the endogenous nature of the adoption 
decision. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
 
The first hypothesis is derived directly from transaction cost economics’ emphasis on hold-up and 
incomplete contracts, proposing that adoption of mobile IT networks leads to changes in the 
boundary of the firm toward more fleet ownership of networked assets: 
 
(H1) Adoption of mobile IT networks should lead to an increase in the fraction of 
vehicles that are owned by the fleet relative to those owned by drivers but 
operated by the fleet. 
 
The “productivity paradox” in information technology (IT), the dearth of causal evidence 
connecting IT adoption and productivity, has been addressed empirically in a number of recent 
papers (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996, 2003; Hubbard 2003; Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw 2005).  
However, only Athey and Stern (2002) have done so convincingly using mobile IT networks 
rather than traditional stand-alone IT.  But mobile IT networks are unique and important in their 
own right, particularly because they directly shift the returns to activities that require 
coordination.2  Because mobile IT networks improve coordination by bringing information to 
                                                 
2 Baker and Hubbard (2003) point out that mobile IT networks can also have monitoring benefits.  
However, in this empirical context monitoring is far less important to taxicab fleets because drivers 
typically have very high powered incentives (e.g., they are full residual claimants) whether they own the 
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bear on resource allocation decisions across a networks of assets, the effect of mobile IT networks 
on productivity are fundamentally different from traditional stand-alone IT, which raises the 
productivity of isolated assets in ways that do not affect coordination directly.  Thus this paper 
hypothesizes that there is a causal relationship between mobile IT network adoption and firm 
productivity, due to coordination benefits: 
 
(H2) Adoption of a mobile IT network should increase firm productivity.  
 
The relationship between productivity and coordination with respect to mobile IT networks 
speaks directly to the importance of assessing the impact of the adoption of mobile IT networks 
on productivity in conjunction with considerations of the boundary of the firm.  Because contract 
theory predicts that adoption of mobile IT networks should exhibit positive dependency with 
changes in asset ownership for reasons of efficiency, this setting is a natural place to consider the 
empirical evidence in support of complementarities in the production function, in the sense of 
Milgrom and Roberts (1990).  I expect that the marginal effect of mobile IT network adoption on 
productivity should be higher in the presence of larger shifts in the boundary of the firm toward 
centralized ownership: 
 
(H3) The firm’s production function should exhibit complementarities between adoption 
of mobile IT networks and increasing fleet ownership of vehicles. 
 
While there is broad support for the hypothesis that complementarities between IT and 
organizational change are an important part of the productivity equation, there is relatively little 
evidence of specific business practices that increase the marginal returns to IT adoption. This 
                                                                                                                                                 
taxicab or lease it from the firm.  I shall therefore emphasize the coordination benefits inherent in mobile IT 
networks throughout the paper. 
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paper examines the complementarities question directly in an industrial context where the 
econometrician can directly observe both shifts in asset ownership and changes in productivity. 
 
5.  Data and Empirical Design 
 
5.1 Data 
 
The core dataset from this paper comes from the 1992 and 1997 Economic Census of 
Transportation and Warehousing firms (ECTW).  The ECTW began tracking the private-for-hire 
industry in 1992 and has continued to track the industry every five years (2002 data has been 
collected but not yet released).  The ECTW is a comprehensive dataset that includes every taxi 
firm in the United States with at least one employee (SIC code 412100):  3,184 in 1992 and 3,337 
in 1997.  I augment the standard ECTW data with the accompanying supplementary files on 
vehicle inventory and segment revenues.  This micro-data is extremely valuable as it includes 
firm revenue, line of business revenue, number of taxis by ownership type (e.g., fleet-owned 
versus driver owned) and organizational form (e.g., partnership, cooperative etc.) which allows 
for a very precise measure of each firm’s factor inputs and output.  There are approximately 1,000 
firms in the 1992 and 1997 ECTW with complete records, which comprise between 60-80% of 
the $2 billion PHV industry.3  The ECTW does not, however, contain mobile IT network 
adoption information. 
 
To generate the dataset used for this paper I merge technology adoption data from the Transit 
Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) and from my own supplemental survey with the ECTW 
data.  The TCRP survey conducted by the Institute for Transportation Research and Education at 
                                                 
3 1,829 observations in 1992 and 1,719 observations in 1997 are considered incomplete and unusable 
because they do not contain the number of taxicabs in their fleet.  This set is primarily administrative record 
(AR) observations – very small firms that the Economic Census does not actually survey but rather imputes 
values for. 
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North Carolina State University in conjunction with the International Taxicab and Livery 
Association and Multisystems, Inc.  A report including summary statistics from the survey was 
published in 2002 under the title “TCRP Report 75:  The Role of the Private-for-Hire Vehicle 
Industry in Public Transit” (1998).  A survey questionnaire was mailed to 13,751 private-for-hire 
operators (taxi, limousine and other private transportation providers) identified from previous 
studies of which 1,691 were returned undeliverable.  677 operators responded to the survey, 
representing at least one fleet from each state.  363 taxi fleets completed all the fields of interest 
for the analyses in this paper including questions about dispatching technology, and number of 
vehicles by ownership type.4  I augmented the TCRP survey with our own survey of the largest 
2,000 taxicab operators in the Dun and Bradstreet national database of firms with taxicab SIC 
codes (e.g., 412100).  391 surveys were returned undeliverable and 403 firms responded with 
complete questionnaires (25% response rate).  272 of the firms that responded to the authors’ 
survey began operations before 1997.  I merged the 635 (363 TCRP observations and 272 author 
survey observations) technology observations with the 3,153 observations in the 1997 ECTW by 
zip code or county and firm size and generated 409 complete observations.5  Of these 409 
observations 532 were in both the 1992 and 1997 ECTW.   
 
See Table 1 for summary statistics and Table 2 for correlations between key variables.  It is 
interesting to note in Table 1 that the secular shift in the industry is away from fleet ownership of 
taxis toward driver ownership of taxis.  Yet I predict the opposite in mobile information 
technology adopters, expecting a shift toward fleet ownership in these firms. 
 
                                                 
4 I are grateful to Tom Cook and Gorman Gilbert for generously sharing the detailed responses to the TCRP 
survey with us. 
5 The 226 unmatched observations were primarily very small firms that could not be matched precisely 
where there were multiple small fleets within a market and fleets that are in the technology survey data set 
but failed to report line of business revenue in the ECTW. 
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In addition to the quantitative data, I conducted 73 semi-structured interviews with city taxi 
regulators (37), fleet owners and mobile IT network technology vendors (26) and taxi drivers (10) 
focusing on the relationship between regulatory change, lateral entry and driver ownership.  
These interviews provided a wealth of insights and anecdotes that greatly facilitated hypothesis 
development for this paper.6
 
One of the key advantages of studying the taxicab industry is that it is comprised of hundreds of 
distinct independent local markets.  The ECTW contains geographic information about firm 
location at the level of zip code, which allows us to take advantage of this natural source of 
variation in the industry.  To do so, I attach additional geographic information such as population 
density, income per capita and regulatory information; group firms into markets; and create 
market-level variables that allow us to exploit the high degree of cross-sectional variation in the 
data by market.   
 
A second important advantage of the taxi industry is that taxi prices are set by local regulation in 
every major market.  This means that productivity regressions with market-level fixed effects 
capture differences in physical output per unit of input across firms rather than relying simply on 
revenue measures of output as most productivity studies do.  A number of papers have 
demonstrated the perils of relying on deflated revenues to measure total factor productivity (TFP) 
including Klette and Griliches (1996), Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2003) and most recently Foster, 
Halitwanger and Syverson (2005), hereafter FHS, who find that prices and technical efficiency 
                                                 
6 I are indebted to C.J. Christina (New Orleans, LA), Jason Diaz CEO of Taxipass (New York, NY), 
Thomas Drischler (Los Angeles, CA), John Hamilton (Portland, OR), Stan Faulwetter (San Jose, CA), 
Alfred La Gasse Executive Vice President of the Taxi Limousine and Paratransit Association (TLPA), 
Kimberly Lewis (Washington, D.C.) Joe Morra (Miami, FL), Marco Henry, President of Yellow Cab 
(Bloomfield, CT), John Perry (Mentor Engineering), David Reno (Boston, MA), Aubby Sherman (Detroit, 
MI), Doug Summers (Digital Dispatch Systems) and especially Craig Leisy (Seattle, WA) for so freely 
sharing with us the wealth of knowledge they have accumulated regarding the U.S. taxicab industry.  I also 
wish to thank the hundreds of taxi company executives who responded to our written mail survey and to 
our requests for interviews at the TLPA conference in Boston, MA in 2006.  I acknowledge excellent 
assistance from YooMin Hong, Elisa Wong and especially Stephanie Simos in conducting survey research. 
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tend to be inversely correlated.  They conclude that, “previous work linking (revenue-based) 
productivity to survival has confounded the separate and opposing effects of technical efficiency 
and demand,” an issue which this paper squarely addresses.  FHS call physical output measures 
of technical efficiency TFPQ to differentiate it from traditional measures of TFP.  This paper 
follows their notation by using TFPQ to represent the technical efficiency of the firm. 
 
Empirical tests are supported by the relatively simple and homogenous production function in the 
taxicab industry, since simple production functions control for heterogeneous influences on 
factors of production and allow the econometrician to isolate the effects of unobserved 
organizational characteristics on observed productivity.  This approach minimizes measurement 
error in the key reduced-form establishment-level productivity measure I employ, total factor 
productivity in quantities (TFPQ).   
 
Following the standard approach for measuring plant (e.g., fleet) total factor productivity in 
quantities (TFPQ) for firm i at time t is computed as the log of its physical output q minus a 
weighted sum of its logged capital k and labor l inputs.  That is, 
 
(1) TFPQit = qit - αktkit - αltlit
 
The key feature of (1) is that output is measured in physical units, rather than in dollars.  When 
output is measured in dollars rather than in physical units, TFP measures are contaminated by 
price differences across firms.  In this dataset we do not observe physical outputs or market 
prices, only revenues in dollars.  However, we can easily recover TFPQ as a measure of physical 
output in this case by including a market fixed effect in a standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function, because market prices are fixed for all firms in a market.  Market fixed effects have the 
added advantage of eliminating unobservable market level characteristics that influence returns.  I 
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compute TFPQ in each time period (e.g., at time t={1992,1997}) so that the market fixed effects 
can vary over time (see appendix I for TFPQ calculations). 
 
5.2 Empirical specification and strategy 
 
To measure the effect of adoption on changes in the dependent variables (total factor 
productivity, TFPQ; and fraction of vehicles owned by the fleet, FOWN) I first calculate changes 
in the dependent variables directs and use (2a) and (2b) to estimate the impact of lateral entry on 
changes in productivity and asset ownership patterns.   
  
(2a) ΔTFPQi = βΔ0 + βΔTΔTECHi + Xc1,iβΔc + εΔi 
(2b) ΔFOWNi = BΔ0 + BΔTΔTECHi + Xc2,iBB
                                                
Δc + eΔi
 
By taking differences in the dependent variables at the firm level equation (2a) and (2b) eliminate 
unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics that impact TFPQ.  Computing firm-level 
differences directly is equivalent to using firm fixed effects when there are only two periods of 
observations and differences are taken in all of variables.7  This approach yields a very precise 
measure of the impact of mobile IT networks on ΔTFPQ as the result controls for both time-
varying market-level fixed effects and firm fixed effects.  Asset ownership regressions are 
differenced at the firm level but not at the market-level.  However, there is little reason to 
expect that market characteristics have much impact on changes in asset ownership. 
Indeed, including market level fixed effects or an additional control that accounts for the 
 
7 To generate the precise firm-fixed effects result I use (2a) and (2b) with differences in the variables 
computed directly and βΔ0 = 0.  In the specifications reported in this paper I include βΔ0 also include time-
invariant factors in (2a) and (2b) as additional controls.  The result is very precise measure of ΔTFPQ as it 
is constrained by time-varying market-level fixed effects and firm fixed effects.   
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rate of change in asset ownership in each market has little effect on the coefficient 
estimates.   
 
Variables that could plausibly shift, directly or indirectly, the supply or demand structure of 
the local taxicab market are included in Xc,i.  Most controls are common to (2a) and (2b), 
they are:  a controls for firms size, measured by changes in taxicabs under management8; log 
population in the market (county); log square miles in the market; and changes in the log of the 
number of taxis under management operated by competing fleets in the same market – a proxy 
the competitive dynamics of the firm’s operating environment is.  I include controls for 
organizational form in the asset ownership regressions (2b) since it is possible that different 
organizational forms face different shocks to their capital budgets, but unlikely that 
organizational form influences changes in productivity. 
 
The main tests rely on within-firm changes specifications.  In appendix II I show the results of 
cross-sectional tests on levels of total factor productivity (TFPQ) and asset ownership using:  
 
(3a) TFPQit = β0 + βTTECH + Xc1,itβc + εit
(3b) FOWNit = B0 + BTTECH + Xc2,itBB
                                                
c + eit
 
In the ideal experiment I would randomly assign technology and factors of production to firms 
and observe how their TFPQ and asset ownership patterns changed relative to firms who did not 
adopt the technology.  However, the decision to adopt a mobile IT network is an endogenous firm 
choice that may be influenced by unobserved factors that are also correlated with changes in 
 
8 Alternative measures of firm size like non-parametric measures of firm size generate very similar results.  
Since log taxi capital is used in the first stage of the total factor productivity regressions I do not use it 
again as a control in equation (2a). 
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TFPQ and asset ownership.  I address the potential for selection bias in the technology adoption 
decision using an instrumental variables (IV) approach that exploits the high degree of variation 
in market characteristics in which taxi fleets operate.  Specifically, I use lagged (e.g., 1992) 
average fleet size for other firms in the same market as an instrument for adoption.   
 
Lagged size of other fleets in the same market should not cause “own firm” to adopt a mobile IT 
network or cause changes in “own firm” productivity or asset ownership.  However, lagged 
average size of other fleets in the same market may be correlated with “own firm” adoption to the 
extent that “own firm” is operating in a market where exogenous characteristics of the market 
necessitate that firms are large on average and therefore tend to exhibit high demand for 
coordination.  One might also expect that knowledge spillovers associated with operating in a 
market where other firms adopt mobile IT networks influence “own firm” adoption since “own 
firm” is more likely to be exposed to the benefits of mobile IT networks when their (large) 
competitors adopt it.  Therefore, lagged average size of other firms in the same market should 
only be expected to have an effect on changes in “own firm” through its effect on “own firm” 
adoption of mobile IT networks.   
 
6.  Results and Analysis 
 
The central tests of the first hypothesis are within-firm regressions on changes in the boundary of 
the firm following the adoption of mobile IT networks.  Table 3 shows the results of the tests of 
this hypothesis.  Column (1) demonstrates a strong unconditional correlation between adoption 
and increases in the fraction of vehicles that are fleet owned on the order of 15%.  This result was 
replicated using firm fixed effects and a time dummy.  The results are much larger (55%) when I 
instrument for adoption using lagged (e.g., 1992) average fleet size of other firms in the same 
market suggesting that true impact of mobile IT network adoption on the boundary of the firm is 
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understated by the OLS regressions.  The vastly different estimates from the OLS versus the 
2SLS regressions reflect the fact that the average firm could only shift 12% of its taxi capacity 
toward driver ownership since the average firm owned 88% of its taxicabs in 1992 (see Table 1).  
Thus, the results suggests that firms would like to shift even more towards fleet ownership of 
vehicles, but that they are limited in their ability to do so by their initial conditions.      
 
Column (3) includes firm and market-level controls that may influence changes in the boundary 
of the firm.  The impact of mobile IT network adoption increases to 19% and is significant at the 
1% level.  IV estimates of the impact of adoption in column (4) conditional on a vector of 
controls are again strongly significant and three times larger suggesting that there are significant 
unobservable characteristics of firms that are correlated with both adoption and the boundary of 
the firm that are captured by lagged average fleet size of other fleets in the same market.  The 
results are robust to alternative specifications:  I tried using a number of alternative measures of 
firm size; a control for the average rate of change in fleet ownership rates by market; including 
non-respondents with a non-respondent dummy; and market-level fixed effects (not reported).  
Each of these alternative specifications and every combination of them yielded qualitatively 
similar results that continued to be statistically significant at the 5% level.  The results are 
consistent with transaction cost economics’ prediction that the adoption of mobile IT networks 
shifts the boundary of the firm toward vertical integration. 
 
An alternative explanation for the pattern observed in Table 3 is that taxi drivers are budget 
constrained and cannot afford to invest in OBC.  This might lead taxi drivers to sell their vehicles 
to a fleet when the fleet invests in mobile IT networks for reasons unrelated to efficiency. 9  In 
this view drivers may capture some of the surplus created by fleets’ adoption of mobile IT 
networks by selling their vehicle to fleets that adopt the technology.  Since our intuition, and the 
                                                 
9 I thank Richard Langlois for suggesting this to us. 
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evidence presented in this paper, strongly suggests that vehicles with OBC are more valuable than 
those without, the budget constraints hypothesis is plausible.  Although I use organizational form 
(cooperative, partnership and sole proprietorship) to proxy for budget constraints faced by the 
firm, the baseline tests do not account for budget constraints faced by drivers.  I consider this 
alternative hypothesis by testing whether adopting fleets acquire more vehicles from independent 
drivers in markets where drivers are more likely to be financially constrained.   Specifically, I use 
population density as a proxy for wealth constraints and then test to see if the interaction between 
adoption and population density impacts firm boundaries.  Since permit prices should be 
correlated with population density, the cost of OBC should have a smaller marginal impact on a 
driver’s resources in high density markets.  To test the effect of driver budget constraints on 
changes in the boundary of the firm I simply add the term DENSITY x TECH to the regression in 
column (4).  The coefficient on DENSITY x TECH operates in the direction expected but the 
effect is small (0.004 per 1,000 people per square mile) and insignificant (t=0.23), providing no 
evidence that wealth constraints have a significant impact on the change in firm boundaries. 
 
Table 4 shows the main tests of the second hypothesis that adoption of mobile IT networks leads 
to improved productivity (TFPQ).  Column (1) shows an economically meaningful and 
statistically significant correlation between adoption and changes in productivity suggesting 
adoption leads to a 15% improvement in productivity.  I interpret changes in productivity in terms 
of real output per unit of input.  In other words the adoption of mobile IT networks is correlated 
with as a 15% increase in ride-miles per taxicab.  Of course, it is unlikely that firms would adopt 
mobile IT networks if they did not lead to increased levels of productivity so this result is hardly 
surprising.  However, this same logic points out how difficult it is to interpret OLS coefficients as 
the causal effect of adoption on changes in productivity.  Since unobserved heterogeneity in the 
usefulness of mobile IT networks to firms implies that only the firms most likely to benefit from 
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the mobile IT networks are likely to adopt it.  Therefore, I instrument for technology adoption 
using a 2SLS approach. 
 
The point estimates are twice as large when I instrument for adoption in column (2), although the 
result is not statistically different from the OLS point estimate.  Column (2) can be interpreted as 
showing that adoption of mobile IT networks causes taxicab ride-miles to increase by 33% 
relative to taxicabs in fleets that do not adopt mobile IT networks, although the standard error is 
much larger than in the univariate OLS regression in column (1).   
 
Adding controls to the OLS regression (column 3) improves the precision of the estimate and 
increases the estimated magnitude of the effect to 20%.  IV estimates of the effect of adoption on 
productivity conditional on the vector of controls are similar in magnitude to the unconditional 
estimates in column (2), although the result is on the margin of statistical significance.  These 
results support the hypothesis that adoption of mobile IT networks increases firm productivity by 
improving asset utilization.     
 
Taken together, Tables 3 and 4 provide evidence that adoption of mobile IT networks 
simultaneously leads to increased firm productivity and causes the boundary of the firm to shift 
toward vertical integration to allow firms to more fully capture the coordination benefits 
associated with the technology.  I formally test for the existence of complementarities in the 
production function in Table 5 by interacting the change in the fraction of vehicles owned by the 
firm with adoption of mobile IT networks.  In each of the specifications (with or without controls, 
on or off the common support of the distribution of firms that adopt or do not adopt mobile IT 
networks) I find no evidence of first-order complementarities in the production function.  The 
point estimate on the interaction term cannot be measured reliably, and in the preferred 
specification the sign on the interaction term is negative, although it usually statistically 
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insignificant or on the margin of significance.  Alternative specifications flip the sign on the 
interaction term so that it operates in the direction expected but the result is never precisely 
estimated and (obviously) not robust to specification.  Thus, I cannot reject that the adoption of 
mobile IT networks independently increases firm productivity and shift the boundary of the firm 
toward firm ownership of vehicles.     
 
Cross-sectional results 
 
The results of the effect of mobile IT network adoption on within-firm changes in productivity 
and the boundary of the firm support the hypotheses discussed above and are broadly consistent 
with the findings of Hubbard (2003) and Baker and Hubbard (2003).  I also check whether our 
results change when I follow their methodology using repeated cross-sections instead of within 
firm changes.  I report the results in appendix II.  In the OLS regressions in Table A2 (columns 1 
and 3) there is only a weak positive and statistically insignificant relationship between adoption 
and higher levels of fleet ownership of vehicles.  However, the 2SLS results are large (on the 
order of 33-57%) and significant (columns 2 and 4) suggesting that adopters would have had 
substantially lower levels of fleet ownership had they not adopted mobile IT networks.   
 
IT network adoption and TFPQ are positively correlated and strongly significant in the OLS 
regressions in Table A3 (columns 1 and 3).   Adopters appear to be approximately 20-25% more 
productive than non-adopters.  However, these results are not robust to 2SLS estimates (columns 
2 and 4), which show similar magnitudes as the OLS regressions but with much larger standard 
errors. 
 
In general, cross-sectional results should be interpreted cautiously as unobserved heterogeneity in 
pre-sample firm or market characteristics that are correlated with both adoption and the 
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dependent variables of interest could bias the coefficient estimates.  In this context, using lagged 
market-level instruments, the 2SLS cross-sectional results are broadly consistent with the 2SLS 
results of the regressions on within-firm changes.  This implies that the effect of unobserved 
within-firm variation on the observed relationship between adoption and higher levels of TFPQ 
and fleet ownership of vehicles is not particularly important in this context, suggesting that 
lagged market-level instruments are sufficient to identify the effects of interest even in cross-
section. 
 
7.  Conclusion  
 
This central proposition of this paper is that the adoption of mobile IT networks leads to 
improved performance through improved coordination and increased vertical integration for 
transaction cost economizing reasons.  By adopting mobile IT networks firms can better 
coordinate resources within the firm leading to improved asset utilization.  By simultaneously 
vertically integrating, firms overcome haggling and hold-up costs associated with implementing 
mobile IT networks, which allows them to leverage the benefits of the technology across the firm.  
Although there is a rich theoretical basis for expecting such effects there has been little work 
testing these propositions empirically in the context of coordination technologies.  This paper 
identifies within-firm effects of mobile IT network adoption on the boundary of the firm and 
performance rather than relying on potentially misleading results from repeated cross-sections as 
previous empirical work has done.  The results suggest that adoption of mobile IT networks 
improves firm performance through improved coordination but requires the firm to shift toward 
an increasingly vertically integrated structure to fully capture the benefits of mobile IT networks, 
although I cannot formally reject the null hypothesis that the asset utilization and asset ownership 
effects operate independently. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A - Unbalanced Panel       
       
 1992 1997 
Variable N Mean Std dev N Mean Std dev
       
TFPQ 229 0.64 1.41 409 0.26 0.82
Taxi revenue ($000) 229 1124 2713 409 1146 3147
Total taxis 229 44 93 409 51 107
Taxi capital ($000) 229 585 1355 409 634 1522
Fleet owned taxis 229 37 90 409 32 90
Driver owned taxis 229 7 30 409 19 59
TECH 229 0.00 0.00 409 0.28 0.45
Taxis in the county –i 229 129 340 409 262 512
Average 1992 fleet size - i  229 18 29 409 15 27
County population (000) 229 695 958 409 799 1322
County square miles 229 1054 1878 409 1164 1899
Sole proprietor 229 0.10 0.30 409 0.15 0.36
Partnership 229 0.01 0.09 409 0.03 0.18
Cooperative 229 0.05 0.21 409 0.03 0.17
  
  
Panel B - Balanced Panel  
 1992 1997 
 N Mean Std dev N Mean Std dev
       
TFPQ 166 0.29 0.71 166 0.39 0.76
Change in TFPQ 166 n/a n/a 166 0.10 0.48
Taxi revenue ($000) 166 1417 3084 166 1855 4564
Total taxis 166 50 103 166 66 123
Taxi capital ($000) 166 683 1536 166 923 1995
Fleet owned taxis 166 44 103 166 50 121
Driver owned taxis 166 6 23 166 16 35
Change in fleet owned taxis (%) 166 n/a n/a 166 -0.19 0.45
TECH 166 0.00 0.00 166 0.34 0.48
Taxis in the county -i 166 151 390 166 288 474
Average 1992 fleet size –i  166 20 31 166 20 31
County population (000) 166 711 1065 166 795 1157
County square miles 166 1100 1576 166 1094 1575
Sole proprietor 166 0.09 0.29 166 0.09 0.29
Partnership 166 0.01 0.11 166 0.02 0.13
Cooperative 166 0.04 0.20 166 0.04 0.20
       
63 firms of the 229 in the 1992 cross-section exited the industry after 1992 leaving 166 
observations in the 1992 and 1997 panel.  There are 243 entrants (between 1992 and 1997) 
in the 1997 Unbalanced Panel. 
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Table 2 – 1997 Balanced Panel Correlations (n=166) 
 
 TFPQ ΔTFPQ Taxi rev. Tot. taxis Taxi K FOWN% ΔFOWN%
TFPQ 1  
ΔTFPQ 0.43 1  
Taxi rev. 0.45 0.23 1  
Tot. taxis 0.14 0.12 0.65 1  
Taxi K 0.15 0.16 0.67 0.98 1 
FOWN% 0.10 0.25 0.22 0.10 0.21 1
ΔFOWN% 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.13 0.73 1
TECH 0.17 0.15 0.29 0.36 0.34 0.09 0.16
Fips taxi-i 0.28 0.21 0.50 0.39 0.41 0.19 0.06
Avg. SZ-i  0.09 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.22
Fips pop 0.05 0.09 0.32 0.49 0.51 0.17 0.11
Fips mi2 0.37 0.13 0.49 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11
Sole prop. -0.09 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13
P-ship -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.02
Coop. 0.10 0.07 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
 
 TECH Fips taxi-i Avg. SZ-i Fips pop Fips mi2 Sole prop. P-ship
TECH 1  
Fips taxi-i 0.00 1  
Avg. SZ-i  0.38 0.11 1  
Fips pop 0.10 0.67 0.07 1  
Fips mi2 0.04 0.40 0.06 0.23 1 
Sole prop. -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 -0.15 0.09 1
P-ship -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 1
Coop. 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.18 0.07 -0.07 -0.03
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Table 3:  Adoption of mobile IT networks and the boundary of the firm 
Within-firm changes 1992 – 1997 
 
Dependent variable = Change in the fraction of fleet owned taxis (ΔFOWN) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  
      
TECH 0.15 ** 0.55 *** 0.19 *** 0.63 *** 
 (0.07)  (0.16)  (0.07)  (0.16)  
Change in taxis   -0.01 *** -0.01 *** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  
Sole proprietor   -0.19 * -0.15  
   (0.11)  (0.14)  
Partnership   -0.08  0.07  
   (0.17)  (0.18)  
Cooperative   -0.06  -0.11  
   (0.09)  (0.13)  
Change in log(taxis in the market -i)   0.02  0.03  
   (0.02)  (0.03)  
Log(population)   0.04  0.03  
   (0.03)  (0.03)  
Log(square miles)   0.02  0.03  
   (0.03)  (0.03)  
Constant -0.24 *** -0.38 *** -0.81 ** -0.87 ** 
 (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.36)  (0.38)  
      
N 166  166  166  166  
R2 0.02  n/a  0.20  n/a  
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the metropolitan statistical area level. 
First-state results for regression (2) using lagged (1992) average fleet size in the same market as 
an instrument were:  IV coefficient 0.006, standard error (0.001).  F-stat = 28, Adjusted R2 = 0.14. 
First-state results for regression (4) using lagged (1992) average fleet size in the same market as 
an instrument were:  IV coefficient 0.005, standard error (0.001).  F-stat = 9, Adjusted R2 = 0.15. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 4:  Adoption of mobile IT networks and productivity 
Within-firm changes 1992 – 1997 
 
Dependent variable = Change in TFPQ 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  
      
TECH 0.15 ** 0.33 ** 0.20 *** 0.31 * 
 (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.07)  (0.18)  
Change total vehicles   -0.00 *** -0.00 *** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  
Change in log taxis in the market -i   0.01  0.01  
   (0.02)  (0.02)  
Log (population)   0.05 *** 0.05 *** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  
Log (square miles)   0.03  0.03  
   (0.03)  (0.03)  
Constant 0.05  -0.01  0.08  0.05  
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.08)  
      
N 166  166  166  166  
R2 0.02  n/a  0.11  n/a  
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the metropolitan statistical area level. 
First-state results for regression (2) using lagged (1992) average fleet size in the same market as 
an instrument were:  IV coefficient 0.006, standard error (0.001).  F-stat = 28, Adjusted R2 = 0.14. 
First-state results for regression (4) using lagged (1992) average fleet size in the same market as 
an instrument were:  IV coefficient 0.005, standard error (0.001).  F-stat = 9, Adjusted R2 = 0.15. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 5:  Complementarities 
 
Dependent variable = Change in TFPQ 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 OLS  Matched  OLS  Matched 
      
TECH 0.12 * 0.10  0.13 ** 0.12 ** 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
      
Change in the fraction of 0.10  0.09  0.05  0.05  
 fleet owned taxis (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
      
TECH x change in the -0.10  -0.11  -0.15 * -0.17 * 
fraction of fleet owned taxis (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09)  
      
Change in log taxis in the market –i   0.01  0.01  
   (0.02)  (0.02)  
      
Change in log (population)   0.03 ** 0.02 ** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  
      
Urban   -0.04  -0.04  
   (0.08)  (0.08)  
      
Constant 0.12 * 0.14 * 0.33 *** 0.30 *** 
 (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
      
N 166  113  166  113  
R2 0.05  0.04  0.14  0.13  
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the metropolitan statistical area level.  
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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Appendix I –  Calculating total factor productivity in quantities (TFPQ) 
 
To calculate TFPQ beginning with the information in (i): 
 
(i) pm + qit = ωktkit + ωltlit + TFPit
 
I wish to recover (1).   
 
(1) TFPQit = qit - αktkit - αltlit
 
If prices were known, I would just subtract pm from (i).  Since I do not observe pm directly in the 
full data set I de-mean the data at the market level by including a market-level fixed effect, which 
eliminates pm and transforms the standard TFPQ calculation in (i) into a market-adjusted measure 
of deviation from mean quantity produced conditional on deviation from mean input levels: 
 
(ii) TFPimt = qit - qmt  - αkt(kit - kmt) - αlt(lit - lmt) 
 
Where (ii) is equivalent to (1) with the addition of market-level fixed effects.10     
 
Equation (ii) generates y=TFPQ, a mean zero approximately normally distributed parameter.  I 
show the results of these regressions in table A1 (below).   
                                                 
10 Alternatively I can obtain (4) by starting with a Cobb-Douglas production function with market-level 
fixed effects and develop (4) directly.  PmtQit = CLitαltKitαktξit, where C=exp(αmtmit).  In logs, pmt + qit = 
αmtmit + αktkit + αltlit + ηit.  De-meaning at the market level, pmt + qit= qmt + pmt + αkt(kit - kmt) +  αlt(lit - lmt) + 
εit.  Where, εit = ηit - ηmt.  Estimating the fitted values I find, (pmt + qit)-hat = qmt + pmt + αkt(kit - kmt) +  αlt(lit - 
lmt).  I then calculate TFPimt ≡ pmt + qit - (pmt + qit)-hat ≡ εit.  This is equivalent to (4).
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Table A1 – Total factor productivity 
 
Panel A – Total factor productivity (TFPQ) calculations 
 
 (1) (2)
 Taxi only Taxi only
 TFPQ TFPQ
 
Year 1992 1997
   
Log capital 0.86 ***  0.83 ***
 (0.03)   (0.03)
   
Constant 1.49 ***  1.41 ***
 (0.13)   (0.14)
   
County fixed effects 200  223
   
N 898   1106
R2 0.74   0.68
  
Panel B – Summary statistics for TFPQ (panel A residuals) 
       
TFPQ       
Mean 0.00   0.00   
Std. deviation 0.69   0.79   
   
Standard errors are robust.  
The results include all firms with SIC codes 412100 (taxicabs) or 411920 (limousines), taxi revenue ≥ 
$10K, at least 2 taxicabs, and at least 2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in either 1992 or 1997.   
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
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Appendix II – Cross sectional results 
 
Table A2:  Adoption of mobile IT networks and the boundary of the firm 
1997 cross-section 
 
Dependent variable = % of taxis owned by the fleet 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  
         
TECH 0.04  0.33 *** 0.06  0.57 *** 
 (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.19)  
Total taxis     -0.00  -0.00 * 
     (0.00)  (0.00)  
Sole proprietor     0.02  0.07  
     (0.06)  (0.06)  
Partnership     0.11 *** 0.27  
     (0.03)  (0.10)  
Cooperative     0.14 *** -0.15  
     (0.03)  (0.14)  
Log(taxis in the market -i)    0.02  0.01  
     (0.01)  (0.01)  
Log(population)     -0.01  -0.03  
     (0.03)  (0.03)  
Log(square miles)     -0.01  0.04 * 
     (0.02)  (0.02)  
Constant     0.60 ** 0.58 ** 
     (0.26)  (0.28)  
         
N 409  409  409  409  
R2 0.01  n/a  0.02  n/a  
Standard errors are robust.  
First-state results for regression (2) using lagged (1992) average fleet size in the same market as 
an instrument were:  IV coefficient 0.005, standard error (0.001).  F-stat = 43, Adjusted R2 = 0.10. 
First-state results for regression (4) using lagged (1992) average fleet size in the same market as 
an instrument were:  IV coefficient 0.004, standard error (0.001).  F-stat = 13, Adjusted R2 = 0.19. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table A3:  Adoption of mobile IT networks and productivity 
1997 cross-section 
 
Dependent variable = TFPQ 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  
         
TECH 0.25 *** 0.14  0.20 ** 0.08  
 (0.09)  (0.23)  (0.10)  (0.28)  
Total vehicles     0.00  0.00  
     (0.00)  (0.00)  
Log(taxis in the market -i)    -0.02  -0.02  
     (0.03)  (0.03)  
Log(population)     0.06  0.07  
     (0.05)  (0.05)  
Log(square miles)     0.00  0.00  
     (0.04)  (0.04)  
Constant     -0.58  -0.62  
     (0.49)  (0.48)  
         
N 409  409  409  409  
R2 0.01  n/a  0.02  n/a  
Standard errors are robust.  
First-state results for regression (2) using lagged (1992) average fleet size in the same market as 
an instrument were:  IV coefficient 0.005, standard error (0.001).  F-stat = 43, Adjusted R2 = 0.10. 
First-state results for regression (4) using lagged (1992) average fleet size in the same market as 
an instrument were:  IV coefficient 0.004, standard error (0.001).  F-stat = 13, Adjusted R2 = 0.19. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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